INTRODUCTION
In June 2012, a group of Muslim Americans and Muslim organizations in New Jersey filed a lawsuit against the New York City Police Department, challenging its surveillance operations as discriminatory against Muslims, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
1 The plaintiffs alleged that following the 9/11 attacks, the NYPD has used "a variety of methods to spy on Muslims," including "snap [ping] pictures, [taking] videos, and collect [ing] license plate numbers of [mosque] congregants" and using undercover cops to pose as members of Muslim groups.
2 The plaintiffs claimed that the program "targets Muslim entities and individuals in New Jersey for investigation solely because they are Muslim or believed to be Muslim" rather than "based upon evidence of wrongdoing."
3 In view of the program's aim and tactics, the plaintiffs also alleged that the program violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause, since the First Amendment demands strict governmental neutrality among religious sects.
4
In February 2014, the District Court in New Jersey dismissed the case for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim, explaining that the plaintiffs failed to identify any cognizable "injury in fact" and that "[t]he more likely explanation for the surveillance was a desire to locate budding terrorist conspiracies" than a desire to discriminate, particularly prompted the U.S.'s "war on terror, 
18
Although the discourse on "Islamic terrorism," analyzing the effects of the label and offering alternative terms, 19 is considerable, in this Article, the term has a limited meaning. The term "Islamic terrorism" reflects the recent attacks by religious extremist organizations as published by news reports, and it is confined to the analysis of the different legal approaches after such attacks to balance antiterrorism policies and freedom of religion. As such, as legal systems continue to respond to acts of Islamic terrorism around the world, 20 it is worth comparing the approaches of the U.S. and the EU -two regions that share historical roots, 21 that similarly protect freedom of religion in their laws, 22 and that also have been targets of terrorist attacks.
23
The question addressed here is: what is the legal impact of Islamic terrorism post-9/11 on the laws governing freedom of religion and on the rights of Muslims in the U.S. and the EU? This broad question can be unpacked: What are the standards for the protection of freedom of religion in the U.S. and in EU member states? Are there any differences between those two legal orders; if so, what are they, and what are their implications? What are the post-9/11 statuses of Muslims and their religious rights? Finally, has the recent rise of Islamic terrorism post-9/11 shifted the U.S. and EU away from legal precedents of previous decades?
In addressing the broad question, comparative methodology will be the driving force in the overall structure of the Article, using a "macro comparative" perspective 24 for the two legal institutions in the first half and a "micro comparative" perspective 25 for the specific issue of freedom of religion in the latter half. In doing so, the Article will first cover the legal infrastructures and mechanisms of protecting freedom of religion in the U.S. and EU, with a focus on the establishment clause jurisprudence. The Article will then focus on the scope of permissible limitations on religious freedoms and, by comparing analogous cases, will identify the differences in permissible limitations between the U.S. and Europe. Then, the Article will summarize some key post-9/11 free exercise cases and compare them to pre-9/11 cases, examining for any differences in how these recent attacks affected the decisions and consequently the rights of Muslims. The Article then offers a number of explanations for the courts' treatment of the post-9/11 cases. Lastly, the Article will briefly study areas of law that absorbed the governments' antiterrorism goals, namely the immigration and national security policies -areas where it seems that Muslim citizens or immigrants were affected.
Focusing on recent cases that attracted the interest of scholars and critics around the world, Freeman v demonstrate favoritism towards the existing religious majorities, both decisions are also in line with the precedents established before 9/11 in the U.S. and ECtHR jurisprudence.
30
Thus, the repercussions of policies targeting Islamic terrorism were not absorbed through legal or judicial limitations on freedom of religion, but were perhaps instead absorbed in other areas of law, namely in immigration and national security, where the administrations have greater discretion and authority. As it will be argued below, both U.S. and European courts have consistently shown deference to the political branches of the government or to the national government of the member state to handle immigration policies and national security issues.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS: FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN THE U.S. AND EU
The concept of freedom of religion, though "the oldest of the internationally recognized human rights," 31 was not fully realized until recently.
32 As one historian in the field noted: "[f]or several thousand years the history of religion was marked by religious intolerance and persecution."
33 This concept of religious freedom made its way into most of the world's constitutions, including those of the West, only after World War II.
34 In response to the tragedies of World War II, the repression of religious groups and the proliferation of new religions, jurists and theologians produced a number of theories of religious rights and human rights.
35 The movement to prohibit religious discrimination and to pro- tect freedom of religion then became part of the broader "rights revolution" around the world.
36
As it stands today, freedom of religion is a fundamental right connected with freedom of thought and freedom of expression, and its legal protection is incompatible with a separation between belief and action.
37
Even in 1948, this right was recognized by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which declared that: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."
38 Thus, over the past sixty years, the right to liberally manifest religious preferences has been cherished and developed to a great extent, especially in the western world.
The West, which generally refers to the United States and the European Union, share a number of key legal principles, in addition to freedom of religion, such as respect for human dignity, rule of law, and democracy. 39 In the context of religion in particular, several aspects are worth comparing to help explain their common goal of protecting religious freedoms: the legal infrastructures and mechanisms of protecting religious freedoms, the historical relationships between religion and state, and the religious demographics of the two regions.
As an initial matter, both the U.S. and EU expressly protect freedom of religion. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
40 From this wording, the two dimensions of religious liberty in the U.S. are, respectively, "free exercise" and "establishment."
41 For the EU, it is important to note that there are three sources of European human rights according to Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union 42 -the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("Charter"), the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"), and the General Principles of European Union's law. However, Article 9 of the ECHR, which provides that "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance,"
43 is the common ground between the three sources of European human rights protection.
44
These laws operate within larger legal infrastructures respectively. Notwithstanding the similar circumstances surrounding their enactments, 45 the Bill of Rights and the ECHR establish certain minimum standards of protections, including those that govern freedom of religion that the U.S. government and EU member states must uphold. These documents only set the floor, and member states in both legal orders have the ability to expand the level of protection beyond these minimum standards.
46
Another similarity is that the Bill of Rights and the ECHR also may be suspended in the event of a national emergency. The U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the authority to suspend the right to relief from The mechanisms of enforcing the protections differ, however, particularly in light of the greater structural differences between the two polities. The U.S. is a "complete federation," with a centralized system, whereas the EU is a non-complete federation with a decentralized system. 49 In the U.S., control over enforcement is delegated to the Supreme Court, an institution established by the U.S. Constitution, and emergency powers are delegated to the federal government.
50 Thus, the framework for suspending provisions within the Bill of Rights is largely based on judgemade law.
51 And the Supreme Court's decisions are binding on all states and on the federal government.
52
In the European Union, on the other hand, control over the ECHR and emergency powers is distributed equally among the member states, and depending on the nature of the violation, control is delegated either to the European Court of Justice or the ECtHR, a non-communitarian body.
53 The ECtHR is comprised of forty-seven judges, one from each member state. 54 The ECtHR has developed a framework for the protection of human rights, but the effects of its decisions depend on the member state's national law.
55 Though respondent states or parties in the case are bound to "respond to the different orders set out under the merits in the operative part of the judgment," member states by and large are not obligated to make the ECtHR judgments executable within their domes- 56 Thus, the ECtHR framework entails a "multilevel structure" since the EU has "an obligation to respect individual member states' constitutional frameworks" and "must generally leave policy determinations on religion-state relations" up to them.
57
Despite their different mechanisms and procedures, both the U.S. and EU are secular institutions. 58 The historical developments that led to each secularist state are vastly different, however. In Europe, the notion of a secularist nation-state first emerged from the Treaty of Westphalia, which provided that "the Sovereign could choose the religion of the State and impose it on his subjects where tolerance, when it existed at all, was justified for prudential and pragmatic reasons."
59 On the other hand, the separation of church and state in the U.S. came about as a result of its founding settler population, who "came [to the U.S.] from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend government favored churches."
60 This history inspired the drafters of the Bill of Rights and shaped the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause provision, which prohibits the establishment of religion by the government.
61
The theoretical implications of a secularist state on its efforts to protect freedom of religion are a bit unclear. In broad terms, secularism can allow a polity to dissociate from a specific religion and thus, promote and protect the free exercise of all religions.
62 But in other ways, it may also dampen the coexistence of the various religions, as it requires each religion to maintain self-restraint and respect for other religions.
63 Aggressive or mechanical insistence on separatism and secularism may push a system 56 towards inadvertent marginalization, insensitivity and possibly intentional persecution of religious groups.
Id

64
That said, scholars have argued under varying views of secularism.
65
Under a view of radical secularism, any connection between the polity and religion, either high or low ("earth") establishments, 66 constitutes a violation of the freedom of religion, as it infringes upon religious equality by promoting a particular belief of "secularism." Under a moderate view, a polity's connection with a particular faith does not infringe upon the freedom of religion to the extent that other means exist to safeguard the same freedom of religion, and other denominations and faiths are not blocked from their right to practice their faith.
67
The interaction between a secularist state and its protection of religious freedoms seems to more clearly play out in the state's exercise of an establishment clause (or lack thereof). The main observation about the EU is the stark omission of an establishment clause in any legal text. In Darby, the ECtHR held that a non-member of the established Swedish Lutheran Church was entitled to an exemption from a tax that supported the Church, to the extent that the tax supported religious activity rather than broadly charitable activity.
72 This decision in Darby clarified the modus vivendi of the existing establishment status of member states with the provision of Article 9 of the ECHR, specifically providing that:
A State Church system cannot in itself be considered to violate Article 9 of the Convention. In fact, such a system exists in several Contracting States and existed there already when the Convention was drafted and when they became parties to it. However, a State Church system must, in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 9, include specific safeguards for the individual's freedom of religion.
73
Again, this position was explicitly reaffirmed in Article 51, entitled "Status of churches and non-religious organizations" of the "Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe."
74
In addition to the approval of religious-political systems in Europe, the existence of political parties with religious roots in the EU Parliament and in member states' parliaments is remarkable. In the EU Parliament, the European People's Party (EPP -ED) is a self-identified Christian Democrat Group; 75 in Germany and the Netherlands, there are respectively the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CDU -CSU), 76 as well as the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA).
77 That said, on the whole, the ECHR does not prohibit any state to associate with religion. What it does prohibit is the establishment of a 72 Id. 73 Id. ¶ 45; ECHR, supra note 43, art. 9. religion (or conversely, the establishment of secularism) that unreasonably inhibits the free exercise of a religion. 83 It is argued that the U.S. is classified as a regime that "may insist on separation of church and state, yet retain a posture of benevolent neutrality toward religion," an "accommodationist regime."
84 Alternatively, it is argued that the establishment clause may be characterized as a negative rule rather than a positive one -providing "freedom from" rather than a "right to religion."
85
In practice, however, this line between church and state in the U.S. is quite blurred. In the actual case of Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court did not strike down the New Jersey state bill, which indirectly benefited Catholic private schools by allowing taxpayers' money to be used to pay the bus fares of the Catholic school pupils, as a part of a general program under which the fares of pupils attending public and other schools were also paid.
86 Though the decision benefited the religious school, the Court reasoned that the New Jersey law had a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion.
87
In another case, Marsh v. Chambers, 88 the Supreme Court upheld the Nebraska Legislature's practice of beginning each session with a prayer led by a State-paid chaplain. Relying heavily on historical evidence as proof of the framers' intent, the Court explained that the practice of opening sessions of Congress with prayer had continued without interruption for almost 200 years, ever since the First Congress drafted the First Amendment, and that a similar practice had been followed for more than a century in Nebraska and many other states.
89 Although disclaiming the use of historical evidence to a certain extent, the majority nevertheless relied on the First Congress' longstanding use of a chaplain as sufficient evidence to infer that the constitutional intent of the drafters was permissive of this particular religious association and that the Establishment Clause does not govern the practice commencing legislative sessions with a prayer.
90
Moreover, considering the sheer number of Christians in each region, Christian tradition undoubtedly has had some influence in U.S. and EU governance; the majority of parliamentary members, government officials, and executive leaders identify as Christians.
91 Aside from the fact that Sundays hold a distinct status in the weekly calendar as a day off, as is required by the Christian tradition, 92 in the EU, Christianity remains the largest religion, with 72% of Europeans self-identifying as Christian.
93
Muslims account for 2% of the population; less than 1% identify as Jewish, Buddhist, or Hindu; Atheists account for 7% and Agnostics account for 16%.
94
Likewise, in the U.S., the largest religion is Christianity.
95 76% of American adults identify as Christians, 1.2% identify as Jewish, 0.5% as Buddhist, 0.6% as Muslim, and 15% as non-religious.
96 Clearly, a nontrivial percentage of the population in both regions freely practices a variety of religions and religious denominations, but the predominant religion among the population and in government remains to be Christianity in both regions.
From examining the two regions' legal structures and mechanisms, their establishment clause jurisprudence, and their religious populations, it is clear that neither the U.S. nor the EU consistently apply a particular separatist or secularist view in protecting the free exercise of religion. Nevertheless, courts in both legal orders seem to defer to the establishment or non-establishment of a religion, so long as this practice is in accordance with longstanding tradition, is not discriminatory, and does not limit the exercise of a different religion.
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II. THE SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11
While the protection of the freedom of religious expression is recognized by the U.S. Constitution and the ECHR, the constitutionalization of this freedom does not necessarily mean that religious expression receives absolute protection. As mentioned above, the U.S. government and EU member states are allowed to suspend the right to religious freedoms in certain circumstances.
98 There are two types of permissible limi- tations on religious freedoms in both regions: one is derived from the text of the Constitution and the EHCR, and the other is derived from caselaw.
A. The U.S. Constitution and the Supreme Court
In the U.S., the first limitation pertains to the scope of applicability of the First Amendment. According to the plain meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, freedom of religion regulates only the conduct of governmental actors in their interaction with private individuals, deemed a "vertical effect," and it does not regulate relations between private individuals, considered a "horizontal effect."
99 In other words, freedom of religion does not apply to private relations or to private actors. Nonetheless, this classification is not absolute because the distinction between private and public actors is not always easily identifiable.
100
The second limitation on the freedom of religion derives from judicial review of government actions or laws.
101 Depending on the nature of the challenged action or law, whether or not it is "neutral" and generally applicable, a free exercise claim can trigger either strict scrutiny or rational basis review.
102 If the action or law is "neutral," that is, has a purpose that is something other than the infringement on or restriction of religious practices, then rational basis review applies.
103 Otherwise, and in the more likely case, strict scrutiny applies, and the burden of the action or law on religious conduct violates the Free Exercise Clause unless it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest.
104
Congress enacted the Religious Freedoms Restoration Act ("RFRA") in 1993, which codifies the strict scrutiny test for religiousbased classifications for federal actions. imposes on a religious practice but is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling purpose, the limitation on religious freedoms is permissible.
106
In practice, U.S. courts have been more deferential to federal governmental actions or laws that have burdened religious freedoms even before 9/11, upholding the majority of challenged laws and actions.
107
This practice especially holds true for state actions and laws, given the application of the lower rational basis test.
108
On the federal level, as one empirical study examined over 4000 reported federal court opinions in the period from 1990 until 2003, there were seventy-three applications of strict scrutiny in published final rulings pertaining to religious liberty, and this category "had the highest survival rate of any area of law in which strict scrutiny applies: 59 percent, more than double the mean of the other doctrinal categories."
109 The study divided this category into two substantive types of religious liberty strict scrutiny cases: claims for exemptions from generally applicable laws, such as exemptions from tax payments or social security programs, 110 and claims that the law or action intentionally targets religious practices with discriminatory motive, such as prohibiting animal sacrifice practices, notwithstanding the business of slaughterhouses.
111
One of the key findings was that the U.S. government was more likely to uphold a federal law or action that refused to grant an exemption on the basis of religion.
112 The study also offered a number of reasons that U.S. courts have been more lenient towards limitations on religious freedoms, particularly in exemption cases.
113 One major reason concerns the potential, overwhelming number of lawsuits demanding religious exemptions to every federal law that might inadvertently interfere with the great diversity of Americans' religious practices.
114 Because these exemption claims inherently are about the claimants' actual conduct of compliance 106 (such as, to pay taxes or social security), "the law must often intrude on that freedom."
Id
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These worries do not seem to control the second category of religious claims, relating to discrimination cases since the challenged law or action often fails the strict scrutiny application in this latter context. 116 The reason for such fatal results stems from the longstanding principle that "a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible."
117
Even before 9/11, a federal court held that a police department's hygiene policy that prohibited wearing beards, except for medical reasons but not religious ones, was discriminatory against Muslims and thus violated the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.
118 The Third Circuit held that "allowing officers to wear beards for religious reasons would not create any more difficulty with regard to identifiability of officers or to their morale and esprit de corps than would allowing officers to wear beards for medical reasons."
119
However, another empirical study of U.S. federal courts, between 1986 and 1995 -again before 9/11 -found "some evidence that adherents to Islam, apparently alone among the non-Christian religious faiths, may encounter greater resistance in pressing claims for religious accommodation in federal courts."
120 In a subsequent study between 1995 and 2005, the results showed that "[w]hile Muslim claimants accounted for 15.6% of free exercise claimants [during this period], they accounted for only 10.0% of successes."
121 The study further claimed that "holding all other variables constant, the predicted likelihood of success for non-Muslim claimants was approximately 38%, while the predicted probability for success for Muslim claimants was approximately 22%."
122 Therefore, based on these studies, it seems that Muslims' difficulty of succeeding in a religious claim persisted even before 9/11. The discussion on the possible the present study, we have expanded the data set to include the set of unpublished but digested opinions available on Westlaw. In addition to 1290 judicial participations from published decisions, our data set for Religious Free Exercise/ Accommodation decisions includes 341 judicial participations from decisions that were digested by Westlaw but not published in the reporter system."). 122 Id. at 236.
reasons for this is outside the scope of this Article; however, scholars have offered a number of explanations, one concerning the "Culture War" between various religious groups.
123
Through its review, the U.S. Supreme Court has nevertheless come up with categorically permissible limitations on freedom of religion. For instance, it banned polygamy as a religious practice, 124 banned the use of peyote, 125 upheld the military regulation prohibiting the wearing of religious headgear, 126 and lowered the level of scrutiny on examining prison regulations.
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B. The ECHR and the European Court of Human Rights
Similar to the scope of the First Amendment, Article 9(2) of the ECHR prescribes three limitations. It provides that:
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
128
In addition to this provision, the ECtHR developed another mechanism, called the doctrine of the "margin of appreciation." 129 This doctrine is based on the Court's belief that national governments are often better suited than international judges to decide whether an interference is justified in light of a particular state's political and social context. Therefore, similar to the U.S.'s strict scrutiny review, the ECtHR's degree of deference to a national government -"the width of the margin" -depends on whether the challenged measure has a legitimate aim and is necessary in a democratic society.
131 Any limitation on the enumerated freedoms, and in particular against the freedom of religion by the member states, must also be proportionate, according to the constitutional principle of proportionality.
132 This principle requires that a measure restricting a fundamental freedom not burden that freedom any more than necessary to achieve its purpose.
133
In Europe, Kokkinakis v. Greece was one of the key cases on the freedom of religion and its limits, as it was the first in Greece decided under ECHR Article 9(2).
134 In this case, Greek authorities convicted a Pentecostal Christian, a Jehovah's Witness, for proselytism.
135 In coming to its decision, the ECtHR emphasized the need to draw a line between "bearing Christian witness" and "improper proselytism," relying on a report by the World Council of Churches from 1956.
136 This Report stated that proselytism "is not compatible with respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of others."
137
As a result, the ECtHR evoked the third circumstance enumerated in Article 9(2), "the protection of the rights and freedoms of others," and held that "in democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone's beliefs are respected."
138
Following this ruling, the balance between secularism and the freedom of religion was reaffirmed through the landmark decision of the ECtHR in Arslan v. Turkey. 139 . 9, 2015) . 140 The particular religious group that attends mosques is "Aczimendi tarikatÿ." Id.
141 Despite the fact that Turkey is not an EU member state, and despite the fact that the vast majority of its population belong to the Muslim religion, the holding group, which . . . was made up of a turban, 'salvar' (baggy 'harem' trousers), a tunic and a stick."
142 They were arrested and convicted of violating Turkish laws that prohibited headgear and religious attire from being worn in public other than for religious ceremonies.
143
The ECtHR distinguished this case Arslan, which concerned punishment for wearing certain clothes in open public areas from other cases which dealt with "regulation[s] of the wearing of religious symbols in public establishments, where religious neutrality might take precedence over the right to manifest one's religion."
144 The Court held in Arslan that there was an interference with the right to manifest one's religion, in part because Turkey was unable to establish the necessity of this interference in a democratic society and was unable to show any evidence of the potential public threat of this religious group.
145
Through its judicial review, the ECtHR has established a certain number of categorically permissible limitations like the U.S. Supreme Court. In another seminal case, Dahlab v. Switzerland, 146 ECtHR held that the measure prohibiting a Swiss teacher from wearing a headscarf in the classroom was "necessary in a democratic society,"
147 and considered it "in principle and proportionate to the stated aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public order and public safety."
148 Here, in prohibiting the wearing of a headscarf, the Court took into consideration the fact that the teacher was a public sector employee, a "representative of the state," who had influence on the intellectual and emotional development of children.
149
C. Comparison of the U.S. and EU Limitations
When comparing the limitations on the freedom of religion in the U.S. and EU, a couple of observations can be made. An overview of the existing analogous case law before 9/11 demonstrates that the respective scopes of limitations do not perfectly osculate -that is, the degree of scrutiny and the level of protection differ for each region.
from the aforementioned case enshrines the balance between secularism and the freedom of religion, while the precedent pertaining to the ECHR Article 9 is in principle valid for any future case adjudicated before ECtHR unless it is overruled. See supra Part I. In the United States, any limitation on the freedom of religionwhether it is a claim concerning religious discrimination or exemptionmade at the federal level must survive the strict scrutiny test, or at the state level, the rational basis test.
150 Whereas, the ECHR provides for a minimum standard of protection, relying on the three-prong analysis and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.
151 The member states may nevertheless provide more stringent standards of protection.
152
An illustration of the different approaches is found on the question of whether public officials must refrain from their religious preferences and practices over state neutrality. At the federal level in the U.S., such rule may not survive the strict scrutiny test, depending on the nature of the duty (whether it is truly an exemption claim or a discriminatory claim); while at the state level, given the holding of City of Boerne v. Flores, 153 which invalidated strict scrutiny for judicial review of state laws, such rule is more likely survive.
On the other hand, the ECtHR may deem such rule or duty as permissible given the low standard of protection, if this duty also does not trigger any of the three conditions under Article 9(2). 154 At the member state level, however, if the ECtHR defers to the state, the outcome may vary depending on the state. On one end, countries like Germany 155 may allow public officers to wear headscarves, and on the end, counties like Switzerland may impose restrictions.
156
Courts on both sides of the Atlantic have not been consistent about determining the types of permissible limitations on the freedom of religion. But notwithstanding these dissimilarities, both the U.S. and EU not only have enacted laws and created legal mechanisms to enforce limitations but also have adjudicated on specific permissible limitations on the freedom of religion before 9/11.
III. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AFTER SEPTEMBER 11:
A CHANGE OF DIRECTION?
Since September 11, Islamic terrorism seems to be on the rise all around the world. 161 has emerged and caused a number of the deadliest attacks, engaging in the most brutal tactics, including the bombings of military camps in Iraq, the beheadings of Iraqi civilian hostages, including of a nine year old girl, 162 the beheadings of American journalists James Foley and Steven J. Sotloff, and releasing the recordings of these terrorist acts through the internet and social media.
163 Second to ISIS, in Nigeria, the Islamist sect known as Boko Haram, has carried out numerous acts of violence; the group abducted hundreds of school children in April 2014 and has killed more than 13,000 civilians over the past five years.
164
This rise of Islamic terrorism is a major concern for legislators and policymakers around the world. Given the pressing need for antiterrorism policies, the question of how to balance this need and the religious rights of Muslims is pertinent. In examining this question, the analysis below is twofold: first, it will explore the recent case law on freedom of religion, and second, it will touch on other areas of law where such RUPLE-decade-9-11.html#ixzz3rJO0AO7n; see also, Terrorist Attempts since 9/11, CBS NEWS http://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/terror-attacks-attempts-since-9-11/4/ (listing over twenty-seven terrorist attempts). 158 Evans, supra note 157. antiterrorism goals may have spilled over, such as in immigration and national security. This analysis will show that both EU member states and the U.S. reacted to the rise of Islamic terrorism in similar ways, but the repercussions of their reactions are most pronounced in the areas of immigration and national security. Remarkably, both of these areas are privileged territories of the executive, as it is broadly claimed that governments enjoy deference on their policies in these areas.
A. The European Union's Response
The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent terrorist acts, including the most recent Paris attacks in 2015, have caused an intense stir in Europe, igniting political debates about terrorism, multiculturalism, Islam, and more specifically, the practice of Islamic headscarves and burqas.
165 The trend across Europe immediately after 9/11 appeared to be greater restriction on particular religious expressions and attire.
In France, a ban on Muslim headscarves and other "conspicuous" religious symbols at state primary and secondary schools was introduced in 2004.
166 More recently, the French Parliament also banned the wearing of the Islamic full, head-and-body veil in public places, colloquially known as the "burqa ban," in 2010.
167 Belgium enacted a similar veil ban in 2011, which "prohibit[ed] the wearing of any clothing entirely or substantially concealing the face" and included criminal sanctions.
168 In Italy, public wearing of the niqab was also banned, making it an offense 169 In Germany, after the decision of its Federal Constitutional Court, it introduced law empowering the authorities to make such a prohibition," 170 and six states have outlawed public school teachers from wearing headscarves.
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However, this trend of bans has not influenced every EU member state. In Britain, the right of a Muslim pupil to wear a jilbab in a State school was vindicated by the British judges.
172 Additionally, Spain 173 and the Netherlands 174 dismissed proposals for similar nationwide bans. France is of particular interest not only because France has the largest number of Muslims in Western Europe but also because it was the first European country to ban the full-face Islamic veil in public places, 175 resulting in some of the most influential cases on religious freedoms for Muslims in Europe. In France, the Islamic headscarf ban in secondary schools was challenged before the ECtHR in 2008 in Dogru v. France, where the ECtHR held that there was no violation of Article 9, reasoning that the law was justified as a matter of principle, and the restriction had been proportionate to the aim pursued. July 1, 2014, the Court released its groundbreaking decision, 178 holding that the French law was in proportion to the state interest of maintaining conditions that allow multiple religions to live together. 179 The Court emphasized that the French government sought to protect and support the principles of interaction between individuals in society, tolerance and broadmindedness, all of which are required for a democratic society.
180
However, the Court qualified their analysis by suggesting that the recent insurgence of Muslim immigrants into France in the past fifteen years may have prompted France's National Assembly's initial report on the veil-wearing community, which in turn, led to the enactment of the country's veil ban.
181
Although the ECtHR deferred to the French government in both decisions, these cases seem to show divergent trajectories from cases before 9/ 11. Regarding headscarves, Dogru was in accordance with the earlier 1998 ruling of Dahlab v. Switzerland, which upheld the ban of Islamic headscarves on teachers.
182 On the other hand, the more recent case S.A.S. contradicts the decision established by the pre-9/11 case Arslan v. Turkey, where the ECtHR held that state secularism may not impose a burden on religious expression, in particular on religious attire in public places. 183 Although many believed that the European Court might have followed Arslan in deciding S.A.S, 184 the Arslan Court did leave open the possibility that sufficient factual evidence could support a general ban, though it did not go so far as describing what kind of evidence would be enough.
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The combination of these two distinct decisions leads to two interpretations. According to the first interpretation, S.A.S. overrules Arslan and now allows for the general restriction on wearing religious or ceremonial clothing in public places. Alternatively, according to the second interpretation, Arslan remains good law because S.A.S. is a limited exception to the rule, with regional application. Specifically, this exception would only apply in France and Belgium due to the special nature of the legal order pertaining to the Laïcit doctrine 186 and only if the religious dress fully covers the face.
A thorough reading of the S.A.S. decision reveals that the ECtHR's intent was not to overrule Arslan. The Court explicitly limited the scope of the limitation to religious apparel that conceals the face. 187 In particular, it noted that:
[W]hile it is true that the scope of the ban is broad, because all places accessible to the public are concerned (except for places of worship), the Law of 11 October 2010 does not affect the freedom to wear in public any garment or item of clothing -with or without a religious connotation -which does not have the effect of concealing the face.
188
Moreover, the ECtHR recognized the exceptional nature of France's relationship between secularism and religious expression.
189
Thus, the different outcome of S.A.S. can be largely attributed to the European Court's state-by-state approach under the margin of appreciation doctrine. As stated earlier, the ECtHR's decisions are binding only on the states that are party to the dispute, since the ECHR does not require that the court's judgments be made "executable within the domestic legal order." 190 Having said that, the ECtHR continues to leave open the issue of the blanket ban of the full-face veil in public places as a categorically permissible limitation under Article 9 of the ECHR.
The European Court's state-by-state approach is also apparent in cases concerning majority religions, as in the recent case of Lautsi v. Italy. 191 In
Lautsi, Italian courts found that crucifixes posted in public school classrooms signified the Christian roots of liberal democracy rather than Roman Catholicism; subsequently, the ECtHR held under the margin-ofappreciation doctrine that this practice did not violate the Convention or threaten related principles of religious pluralism or freedom because the crucifix was a mere "passive" symbol that exerted no effect on non-Catholic students without other evidence of religious coercion.
192
This case illustrates the compatibility of low establishment practices of the member states -namely, the display of crucifixes in classrooms of state schools -with the principle of state neutrality over religion, which in essence waters down the strict application of the principles of secularism and neutrality over any religion. For the most part, the European Court accepted the argument of the Italian government that crucifixes in classrooms are a "national particularity" according to Italy's historical development, 193 while also explicitly stating that "the decision whether or not to perpetuate a tradition falls in principle within the margin of appreciation of the respondent State."
194
B. The United States' Response
In the U.S. legal order, it is alleged that because of the terrorist attacks, "America's tolerance toward Muslims 197 by ordering her to have her photo retaken for a driver's license after the first was taken with her wearing a veil. The trial court found that the state had a compelling interest to order Freeman to retake her driver's license picture to protect the public from criminal activities and security threats and reasoned that "having access to photo image identification [was] essential to promote that interest."
198 The Florida Court of Appeals affirmed this decision by concluding that the full-face photo requirement did not substantially burden Freeman's free exercise of religion 199 and that her equal protection claim was without merit. 200 
Some scholars
201 perceived the decision in Freeman as a departure from the precedent set in an earlier pre-9/11 case that similarly concerned a state's photo requirement for licenses, Quaring v. Peterson. 202 In Quaring, plaintiff's refusal to have her photograph taken was based on her religious convictions, which disallowed "any graven image or likeness," 203 a literal interpretation of the Second Commandment of the Bible. The Eighth Circuit held that Nebraska's requirement of having a color photograph for the license unconstitutionally burdened Peterson's free exercise of her sincerely held beliefs, and that permitting Peterson to receive a license without a photo was a reasonable accommodation of religion and did not violate the establishment clause.
204
To some scholars, this departure was considered a counteraction to the 9/11 attacks. 205 The Florida court in Freeman also expressly acknowledged the issue of national security, stating that in the past twenty-five years, the country has seen "new threats to public safety, including both foreign and domestic terrorism" and thus this movement required that Freeman's religious freedom be subordinated to the "safety and security of others."
206 As a direct response to Freeman's claim that she was singled out because of 9/11, the court said that it "would rule the same way for anyone -Christian, Jew, Buddhist, Atheist."
207 The Florida court also pointed out that the state's requirement of a permanent file photo of every license holder, as part of the driver and vehicle identification database, had been under development before 9/11.
208
Nebraska had already "exempt[ed] numerous motorists from having a personal photograph on their license. 209 In addition, the photograph requirement infringed substantially on the religious freedom of Quaring since her faith expressly prohibited any use of graven images. 210 Moreover, a careful analysis shows that the decision in Freeman consistently applied the lower, "substantially burden" requirement test, 211 as the strict scrutiny test was not applicable to state law cases.
212
A recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Holt v. Hobbs, 213 illustrates the application of strict scrutiny for religious claims in a way that was consistent with the pre-9/11 case Fraternal Order of Police Newark, 214 in New Jersey mentioned above. Like the New Jersey case, in Holt v. Hobbs, the Court found that an Arkansas prison's grooming policy that prohibited inmates from growing a beard substantially burdened the plaintiff's Islamic beliefs. 215 Though the analysis centered on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2003 (RLUIP), which differs from the Free Exercise Clause analysis, 216 the Supreme Court agreed with the prison's compelling interests of stopping the flow of contraband concealed in beards and facilitating prisoner identification, 217 but the Court ultimately concluded that the prison failed to show its policy was the least restrictive means of furthering either of the asserted compelling interests.
218
The low establishment standard was nevertheless set quite recently with the U.S. Supreme Court case Town of Greece v. Galloway. 219 The Supreme Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that the state of New York may permit chaplains to open each legislative session with a prayer as this practice did not violate the establishment clause. 220 For the majority, Justice Kennedy wrote that "[l]egislative bodies do not engage in impermis-sible coercion merely by exposing constituents to prayer they would rather not hear and in which they need not participate."
221 Justice Kagan, for the minority, described the practice rather compellingly: "So month in and month out for over a decade, prayers steeped in only one faith, addressed toward members of the public, commenced meetings to discuss local affairs and distribute government benefits."
222 She argued, "[i]n my view, that practice does not square with the First Amendment's promise that every citizen, irrespective of her religion, owns an equal share in her government."
223
Despite the sound arguments expressed by the minority of the Supreme Court, the precedent of Galloway does not depart from the principles established in the earlier Marsh case involving the Nebraskan legislature and its practice of beginning each session with a prayer. 224 However, it is remarkable that the logic of the majority's opinion, noting the importance of preexisting religious practices and establishments, resembles the logic of the Commission's Report of the ECHR in Darby v. Sweden, which stated that a state-church system cannot in itself be considered a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.
225
C. Possible Explanations for the Same Direction
The analysis above shows that the standards of protection pertaining to freedom of religion were not significantly affected by the post-9/11 regimes. There are a number of possible explanations for this consistent treatment, some of which are articulated in the recent order reversing the dismissal in Hassan v. City of New York.
226
Perhaps American judges are now more mindful of the history of wrongly-decided cases, particularly those governing fundamental rights. As the Third Circuit described in Hassan, "[w]hat occurs here in one guise is not new. We have been down similar roads before, [an example being with] Jewish-Americans during the Red Scare." 227 The Court pointedly stated, " [w] e are left to wonder why we cannot see with foresight what we see so clearly with hindsight -that '[l]oyalty is a matter of the heart and mind[,] not race, creed, or color.'" 228 More broadly, on the issue of the correlation between religion and terrorism, the Court stated that "to infer that examples of individual disloyalty prove group disloy-alty and justify discriminatory action against the entire group is to deny that under our system of law individual guilt is the sole basis for deprivation of rights."
229
Or perhaps judges realize that their job is strictly judicial -that judges "can apply only law, and must abide by the Constitution, or [they] cease to be civil courts and become instruments of [police] policy." 230 Perhaps, alluding to the "political question doctrine,"
231 judges may have realized that they are not the appropriate players to influence or enact antiterrorism policies in the U.S.
In the same way, the ECtHR may have been using the margin of appreciation doctrine, to defer to the European national governments, particularly for such salient issues as religious freedoms and antiterrorism policies. The institutional position of the courts in society, based on their longstanding processes, allows judges to approach the cases unaffected by political pressure or public sentiment, and to deal with cases based on the longstanding values of the law. As the analysis below will show, the reaction of both legal orders was most pronounced in areas of law where the executive branch traditionally holds more discretion, namely in national security and immigration.
IV. REPERCUSSIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION POLICY
Undoubtedly, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the events that followed in Europe accelerated the adoption of stricter antiterrorism legislation in Europe and in the United States, 232 as the correlation between Islamic terrorism and immigration was brought to the surface. 233 Indirectly, concerns regarding freedom of religion are raised in these new national security and immigration policies. Of particular concern are new laws enacted through European immigration policies that make it easier to monitor or deport foreigners, especially Muslim immigrants, even if the authorities have not accused them of any terrorist offense.
As Kim Lane Scheppele accurately remarked, although the EU had lacked a comprehensive framework and thus must rely on the member states for enforcement, after 2001, it adopted a common policy of coordination and cooperation between police and intelligence services. 234 It also implemented the pan-European arrest warrant, and it advanced judicial cooperation as it adopted a Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism.
235
In addition, the framework on family reunification was amended in 2003, in effect making it more restrictive.
236
In several EU countries, anti-terrorism legislation and new immigration laws were passed, and concerns emerged regarding the compatibility of the enumerated measures with human rights principles, especially the principle of freedom of religion. 237 One example is the enactment of the British law, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act in 2006, which was primarily aimed to "send a signal that Muslim communities were not to be victimized." 238 However, this Act evidently interfered with the freedom of religious speech as it criminalized the incitement of religious hatred speech;
239 thus its enactment only succeeded after numerous attempts and revisions.
240
In addition, the UK Parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act in 2001, 241 which was characterized as "draconian" legislation. 242 This was particularly true in relation to Section 23 that, although temporary, provided for the indefinite detention of non-nationals suspected of terrorism 243 and Section 94 that provided for the power of the police to remove disguises that prevent the identification of any person.
244
On the other hand, in the U.S., the fact that the counterterrorism measures involved the monitoring of religious speech raised several concerns.
245
This kind of measure has engendered First Amendment freedom of speech problems, which are indirectly related to freedom of religion, given that the distinction between religious speech and religious belief is very narrow.
246 Pertaining to U.S. immigration law, allegations have been made that Muslim immigrants are being discriminated against, based on the fact that the judiciary, according to the plenary doctrine, defers to the political branches of the government on immigration issues.
247 By mid-2002, the U.S. Department of Justice also required certain immigrants from Muslim and Arab countries to be fingerprinted and photographed, a policy that raised additional concerns of discrimination.
248
Currently, the ongoing case of Hassan v. City of New York 249 is highly relevant to this discussion. The question again before the district court is whether the surveillance project undertaken by the police department was discriminatory and infringed upon Muslims, solely on the basis of their religion. 250 To what extent such policies targeted Muslims remains to be proved. What is certain at this moment, however, is that the changes in the laws and the political processes governing national security and immigration partly resulted from the courts' deferment to the executive branches to address the evident rise of Islamic terrorism in both regions.
CONCLUSION
Although there are clear differences in the legal structures and mechanisms of the U.S. and EU, the two regions share a number of important characteristics. Both expressly protect freedom of religion in their laws but limit the scope of the protection in the instance of a national emergency. While the U.S. has a clear establishment clause, which favors neutrality over an established religion or religious practice, the EU, with its allowance of state-church systems, still manages to protect other religious minorities. Both regions also allow for a number of permissible limitations on religious freedom, but the applicability of these categorical limitations varies for the U.S. and for the EU, with its numerous member states.
Nevertheless, as Islamic terrorism continues to rise in and around the Western world, both regions have responded to the matter of religious freedom in similar ways. Undoubtedly, after the numerous terrorist attacks after 9/11, the issue of freedom of religion has readily engendered controversies in both academic and policymaking discourses. An analysis of post-9/11 cases in the U.S. and EU, however, shows that the level of protection and the degree of permissible limitations on religious freedoms have remained consistent with the pre-9/11 precedents. The ECtHR decisions that permitted France's veil and burqa bans were treated the same before and after 9/11, as both relied on the margin of appreciation doctrine and the three prong analysis under Article 9. Moreover, the applicability of these post-9/11 cases is clearly limited to France and its unique domestic legal order.
In the U.S., the state court's decision regarding the photo identification of a Muslim veiled driver is in accordance with the lower, rational basis review for state neutral actions and laws. Furthermore, the cases in the U.S. and EU that demonstrate low establishment, in that they allowed for Christian symbols in Italian schools or prayers before state legislative assemblies, do not depart from the existing legal precedents that deferred to member-state's policymaking decision and that agreed with historical practices, respectively.
Thus, the legal rights and the religious freedoms of Muslims in the U.S. and EU have not effectively changed in this respect since 9/11. Although there have been some limitations, they are consistent with past permissible restrictions. The reasons behind prior treatment of Muslims is beyond this Article's scope. As discussed above, the courts' consistent treatment of Muslims' religious rights may be attributed to the courts' continued belief that a person's religion does not reflect disloyalty to the country, based on past lessons of religious discrimination cases. Or it may be due to the courts' recognition of its role in policymaking in light of the plenary doctrine or the ECtHR and its margin of appreciation doctrine. The European doctrine, in particular, has allowed the Court to defer to national governments for important policy and domestic matters.
However, it seems that the areas of immigration and national security have absorbed the repercussions of the regions' reactions to Islamic terrorism, which in effect may have restricted Muslims' rights in these areas. It is clear that national security has become the top priority for both the U.S. and EU legal orders after 9/11; both have enacted more stringent and aggressive immigration policies and surveillance programs. To what extent such policies and programs have been ultra vires and have disproportionally affected Muslim citizens and immigrants living in the U.S. and Europe is still open to debate.
While religious discrimination claims may still be stronger and may more likely prevail over free exercise claims for Muslims, at least in the United States, the Hassan v. City of New York will perhaps shed more light on how far the U.S. will go to protect Muslims Americans' freedom of religion, almost two decades after 9/11.
